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ABSTRACT
Today’s queueing network systems are more rapidly evolving
and more complex than those of even a few years ago. The
goal of this paper is to study customers’ behavior in an un-
observable Markovian M/M/1 queue where consumers have
to choose between two strategic decisions about informa-
tion acquisition before joining or not the queue. According
to their decision, customers decide to give up the service
(balk the system) or to join the queue. We study the Nash
equilibrium strategies: we compute the equilibrium and we
prove its existence and uniqueness. Based on this result,
we consider the problem of revenue maximization where the
provider has to choose between two charging mechanisms:
to charge the access to the system or to charge the queue
length information to new incoming customers. We propose
an heuristic algorithm to solve the considered problem and
numerical experiments have been conducted in order to illus-
trate the result. We show that, depending on the sensitivity
of customers to their waiting time, the provider will change
the pricing policy used. Particularly, when customers are
more sensitive then the provider will charge the information
instead of the access.
Index Terms: M/M/1 System, Queuing games, Strategic
decision, Pricing policy, Revenue-maximization
1. INTRODUCTION
Waiting in unobservable queue systems causes frustration
and annoyance to customers. The good news is that cus-
tomers can make the situation better by acquiring on-line in-
formation of the queue-length and decide after that, whether
to join the system or balk. The cost to acquire this infor-
mation can be very different depending on the context. In
many cases, this information is available at no charge, but
still it is not costless to the customers who spend time and
effort to obtain it, whether they pre-register, download rele-
vant application, or even acquire relevant terminal interface
equipment.
There are numerous examples of queuing systems which
provide the queue-length information on-line. This is the
case, for example, of Google restaurant requests, where the
average wait times are now viewable in Maps to approxi-
mately one million restaurants around the world. Devices
follow the waiting time and inform searchers how long they
should expect to wait. Also, many hospitals and health-
care services in the United States and Canada have recently
provided current waiting times on its web site. For On-
line queue-length information in the hospitals you can see:
Florida Hospital 1, The Ontario site web Reston hospital
center 2 and the JFK medical center 3. In our problem, we
consider customers arriving to a single-server queue. The
decision taken by each customer is not related to joining or
not the system, but to acquire or not the information. Cus-
tomers may choose to acquire information about the queue
length with a fixed cost in order to take their decision. The
cost of inspection is imposed by the service provider. If a
customer inspects the queue, the next step is similar to Naor
[1] observable-queue model. Otherwise, customer decides to
join the system without observation.
In our model, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the
equilibrium and we analyze the impact of inspection cost
and the access fee on the revenue of the service provider.
The study of queueing systems was started with Naor [1]
who studied the observable M/M/1 queue and assumed that
an arriving customer observes the number of customers and
then makes his decision whether to join or balk the queue-
ing system. Then, Edelson and Hildebrand [2] considered
the same problem in unobservable case: they assumed that
the customers make their decisions without being informed
about the queue-length information. Articles [5, 6] was com-
pared between extreme configurations when all costumers
have queue-length information or no one have it. Recently,
R. Hassin and R. Roet-Green [4] have showed a deep and
comprehensive analysis for the queueing M/M/1 model where
the costumers choose to: join the queue, balk, or inspect
the queue length. They have computed the equilibrium and
analyzed the impact of inspection cost on equilibrium, rev-
enue and social welfare. They discussed both homogeneous
and heterogeneous customers, and obtained various results.
However, the authors do not have a closed-form expression of
the equilibrium strategy. Our model can be seen as a special
case of theirs (restricting the decision space to 2 actions) but,
by doing that, we are able to study a high level optimization
problem for the provider about which pricing mechanism to
use in order to maximize his revenue. Information structure
proposed to customers is studied in [8]. Particularly, the
authors study how the service provider can use the delay
announcements, like estimates of waiting time or place in
the queue, in order to induce the appropriate customers’ be-
1www.floridahospital.com
2www.restonhospital.com
3jfkmc.com/our-services/er-wait-time.dot
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havior, so as to maximize her own profits. Recent empirical
studies have been performed in hospital networks in United
States. Those studies have shown that oscillations in the
incoming arrival of patients can be observed when patients
are sensitive to delay announcements [9]. These oscillations
may cause an increase in the average waiting times for pa-
tients. This paper provides empirical evidence that patients
take delay information into account for making their deci-
sion. A recent survey [10] describes almost all the research
articles related to strategic queueing systems. In this survey
book, chapter 3 is related to information in these problems.
And, as a reader can see, there are no articles that study the
problem in which the strategic decision of each customer is
to acquire or not the information; and not to join or balk the
queue. Many articles study the impact of heterogeneity in
the population between informed and uniformed customers,
design of optimal signaling mechanisms and processing time
information. In contrast with previous papers, our work fo-
cus on the information acquisition decision process by each
customer, and how this decision is affected by provider’s cost
and how it affects the decision of every customers (equilib-
rium situation). The main contributions of our work are:
• to model an information acquisition game for an M/M/1
queue with strategic customers,
• to characterize the equilibrium situation in which no
customers has an interest to deviate about his decision
to acquire or not the information,
• to study the impact of information cost on a global per-
formance which is the revenue of the service provider,
• to compare two charging mechanisms in order to op-
timize the provider’s revenue: to charge the access to
the queue or the information to customers.
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the
mathematical model and the equilibrium analysis. Section 3
deals with the revenue maximization problem and in section
4 we analyze analyze the best pricing mechanism between
charging the access to the queue or the information to cus-
tomers. Our results are numerically illustrated in section 5
and section 6 concludes our work.
All proofs are given in the appendix.
2. MODEL DESCRIPTION
We consider an unobservable M/M/1 queue system where
customers arrive according to a Poisson process with inten-
sity λ. Service times are assumed to be independent and
exponentially distributed with rate µ. We assume arriving
customers face two possible actions : to acquire the queue-
length information or not. Based on the action taken, each
customer decides to join or balk the system. Figure 1 shows
the customer’s decision process. The information acquisition
process is out of scope of the work and we assume that ev-
ery customer gets perfect information in real time, meaning
that it is exactly the actual number of customers waiting in
the system. The cost of each time unit spent in the system
is noted by CW and the cost of inspection, imposed by the
provider, is CI where CW > 0 and CI ≥ 0. If it is not di-
rectly charged by the service provider, the latter inspection
cost may incur from the information acquisition process that
needs specific tools (an access to the Internet, to call a data
center, to reach a specific location, etc.). Finally, all cus-
tomers who join the system have the same service valuation
R > 0. Note that, like in most papers related to strate-
gic decisions in queueing systems, we consider homogeneous
population of customers , i.e. same service time and costs.
The generalization to heterogeneous customers is proposed
as a perspective of this work.
Figure 1: The decision process of each arriving customer.
p denotes the probability that a new customer acquires the
queue-length information.
2.1 Joining process
The customer who gets the information, decides to join the
queue or balk based on queue-length information and evalu-
ation of the service. According to Naor’s model, a customer
in an observable queue system with i customers already in
the queue, joins if and only if i ≤ ne − 1, where:
ne = b Rµ
CW
c. (1)
The system utilization factor is defined by: ρ = λ
µ
, where
λ < µ. A consequence of this joining process is that the
effective arrival rate λe of customers to the system depends
on the current number of customers in the queue, that is:
λe =
{
λ if i ≤ ne − 1,
(1− p)λ otherwise.
We look now for determining the stationary distribution of
the Markov process considering state depending rates. The
balance equation for states i ∈ {0, . . . , ne − 1} is given by:
λpii = µpii+1,
where pii is the stationary probability in state i. For states
i ≥ ne, the balance equation is:
(1− p)λpii = µpii+1.
To simplify the following computations, we define η = 1 −
(1 − p)ρ. Then, the stationary distribution for any states
i > 0, depending on stationary probability pi0, is:
pii =
{
ρipi0 if i ≤ ne − 1,
ρne(1− η)i−nepi0 otherwise.
Finally, by summing to one, the stationary probability pi0
that the queueing system has no customer is:
pi0 = [
ne−1∑
i=0
ρi +
∞∑
i=ne
(1− η)i−ne ]−1 = [1− ρ
ne
1− ρ +
ρne
η
]−1.
The stationary probability pi0 that the queueing system has
no customer is:
pi0 =
η
neη + 1
.
The expected utility UI for a customer who gets the queue
length information is given by:
UI =
ne−1∑
i=0
pii(R− CW i+ 1
µ
)− CI . (2)
The expected utility for getting the queue length information
can be simplified to:
UI = pi0[R
1− ρne
1− ρ −
CW
µ
1− (ne + 1)ρne + neρne+1
(1− ρ)2 ]− CI .
The expected utility UNI for a customer who do not get the
queue length information and joins directly the system is
given by:
UNI =
∞∑
i=0
pii(R− CW i+ 1
µ
). (3)
This expected utility for not getting the queue length infor-
mation can be simplified to the following expression:
UNI = (R− CW
µ
pi0[
1− (ne + 1)ρne + neρne+1
(1− ρ)2
+
ρne(neη + 1)
η2
]).
We now look for equilibrium in terms of proportion of cus-
tomers who decide to get the queue length information. Note
that this proportion is equal to the probability with which
each customer will decide to get the queue length informa-
tion. Indeed, each customer takes a deterministic action
(to get the queue length information or not) with the same
probability distribution, that is here a Bernoulli distribution
with parameter p. Therefore, the proportion of customers
who get the queue length information is exactly p. Before
investigating the equilibrium, let us give the first property
of the expected utilities depending on this proportion p.
Observation 1. We consider that there is no cost to get
the queue length information, i.e. CI = 0, then:
∀p ∈ [0, 1], UNI(p) < UI(p).
This observation states an intuitive result that implies
that any customer will decide to get the queue length in-
formation when this action does not imply any specific ad-
ditional cost. A corollary of this observation is that, when
CI = 0, the equilibrium is p
∗ = 1.
2.2 Equilibrium
Previously, we have been able to demonstrate a first sim-
ple intuitive result on the equilibrium in a very specific con-
text where there is no cost for information. We look now
for an equilibrium in the general case. Let us first define
an equilibrium for our queueing game with indistinguish-
able infinitely many players. In this case, we can study
the equilibrium by considering the utility of one tagged cus-
tomer against the whole population. Therefore, we denote
by U(p, p′) the (expected) utility of customer who decides
to get the queue length information with probability p when
everyone else get this information with probability p′. Then,
we have:
U(p, p′) = pUI(p
′) + (1− p)UNI(p′).
We can now formalize an equilibrium strategy as follows.
Definition 1. A (symmetric) equilibrium is a strategy p∗
such that:
p∗ = arg max
p
U(p, p∗).
An equilibrium is a best response against itself and equilib-
rium here is in the sense of Nash equilibrium. Based on the
equilibrium formal definition, we are able in the following
proposition to express explicitly the proportion of customers
who decide to get the queue length information depending
on the parameter of the system.
To simplify the presentation, we define the following vari-
ables:
K1 = ρ
ne(CW (ne + 1)−Rµ),
K2 = CI(1− ρne+1),
K3 = µCI(1− ρne)ρ2,
K4 = −
(
CI(1− ρne )ρµ+K2ρµ+ (1− ρ)(ρne+1CW −K1ρ)
)
,
K5 = K2µ−K1(1− ρ),
∆ = K24 − 4K3K5.
Theorem 1. For each parameters set of the system, an
equilibrium p∗ exists and is uniquely defined as:
p∗ =
2ρ− 1
2ρ
− (1− ρ
ne+1)
2ρ(1− ρne ) −
(1− ρ)(ρne+1CW −K1ρ)−
√
∆
2µCI(1− ρne )ρ2
,
if p∗ ∈ [0, 1]. Else, the equilibrium is either 0 or 1.
3. REVENUE MAXIMIZATION
In this section, we investigate the problem of maximiz-
ing the provider’s revenue. This type of problem is mostly
answered by considering charging the access to the queue-
ing system. The most well-known problem is the optimal
toll pricing mechanism which is applied mainly in routing
games [11]. In our problem, the information given to cus-
tomers affect their behavior and therefore a provider may
optimize his revenue by charging the information instead
of the access to the queue. And, we can expect that the
maximum of the revenue obtained by the provider can be
higher by using such charging mechanism compared to the
one obtained by charging the access as a toll. The rest of the
paper aims to answer this question: is it more profitable for
the provider to charge the information instead of the access
to the system? And we will see that the answer is highly
dependent of the customers sensitivity to their waiting time.
The objective function, provider’s revenue, is the same
considering both charging mechanism but the provider’s con-
trol is different. We denote by RI (resp. RA) the provider’s
revenue that depends on the information price CI (resp. the
access price Cacc). Note that the variable CI that was de-
noted as a cost in previous section is now controlled and
becomes a price/charge imposed by the provider. Then, the
objective function problem for the provider considering the
information charging mechanism can be written as:
RI(CI) = λp
∗(CI)CI , (4)
where p∗(CI) is the proportion of customers who accept to
pay for the information, and
RA(CAcc) = λq
∗(CAcc)CAcc, (5)
where q∗(CAcc) is the proportion of customers who pay the
access to the queue. Note that in this context, customers
who do not pay, do not have access to the service whereas, in
the other case, where the service provider charge the queue
length information, some customers do not join even if they
have paid for getting the information.
3.1 Charging the access to the queue
If the provider decides to charge the access to the queue,
its optimization problem can be written as:
max
CAcc
RA(CAcc) = max
CAcc
λq∗(CAcc)CAcc,
considering that depending on the access price CAcc, part of
the customers join the queue and part of then balk; given
that customers do not know the queue length. This problem
corresponds to the unobservable strategic queueing problem
studied in [2]. The equilibrium (proportion of customers who
join the queue) depending on the parameters of the system
and particularly the access fee is given by:
q∗(CAcc) =

1 if CAcc ≤ R− CWµ−λ ,
µ− CW
R−CAcc
λ
if R− CW
µ−λ ≤ CAcc ≤ R− CWµ ,
0 if CAcc > R− CWµ .
We observe that the equilibrium q∗(CAcc) is decreasing with
the access fee CAcc which is an intuitive result. Moreover,
as we can expect, the revenue is zero if the access fee is zero
and, at the opposite, when the access fee goes to infinity the
revenue tends to be also zero. Then, by continuity of the
function, there exists almost one optimum access fee C∗Acc
that maximizes the provider revenue RA(CAcc) when the
provider decides to charge the queue access to the customers.
In fact, we can prove easily that this maximum is unique and
we denote it by R∗A := maxCAcc RA(CAcc).
Proposition 1. When the provider decides to charge the
queue access to customers, the maximum revenue R∗A is
given by:
R∗A = max{RA(R− CW
µ− λ ), RA(R−
√
RCW
µ
)}.
Then, the optimal access fee is either R − CW
µ−λ or R −√
RCW
µ
. In next section, we study the optimization of the
provider’s revenue when the provider decides to charge the
information instead of the queue access to customers.
3.2 Charging the information
Considering that the provider is charging the information
and not the access, it means that the control variable of the
provider is the parameter CI . Then, the provider determines
the optimal information fee C∗I that optimize his revenue
which is expressed by:
RI(CI) = λp
∗(CI)CI ,
where p∗(CI) is the equilibrium (proportion of customers
who pay for the information queue length) that depends on
the information fee.
We propose an heuristic based on the redefinition of the
inspection cost/access fee at each iteration, which influences
the equilibrium and then the value of the revenue. The
algorithm follows the process described in figure 2.
Figure 2: Flowchart of Revenue Optimization Heuristic.
In fact, due to the strict concavity property of the revenue,
the algorithm starts the exploration with a price equals to
zero and increases with a fixed step this value until the rev-
enue decreases. At that final step, the algorithm has reached
the maximum value of the revenue denoted by R∗I .
Based on the optimization results of the two previous pric-
ing mechanisms, the provider is able to determine the best
mechanism depending on an important parameter which is
the waiting cost CW . Indeed, this parameter describes how
customers are sensitive to waiting time duration into the
queue.
4. OPTIMAL PRICING POLICY
We assume that the provider wants to determine which
pricing mechanism between charging access or information
leads to the best revenue. Particularly, we are interested
in the sensitivity of this choice depending on an important
social parameter which is the waiting cost CW of customers
into the queue. Such problem is depicted on figure (3).
First we demonstrate that optimal revenue is strictly de-
creasing as a function of waiting cost when the provider
Figure 3: Choosing the best pricing mechanism for the
provider.
charge the access to the queue and when he charges the
queue length information, optimal revenue is equal to zero
when CW tends to zero and goes to infinity when CW tends
to infinity. And second, as a corollary of these results, we
show that when the waiting cost is low (i.e. customers are
not very sensitive to the waiting time) the provider should
charge the access, whereas when the waiting cost is high
the provider should preferably charge the information. Note
that the estimation of the waiting cost can be obtained
through statistical analysis of customers experience data ex-
tracted for surveys. This problem is related to numerous
works that have been done considering impatience in cus-
tomers decisions in such complex strategic queueing systems
[12].
Proposition 2. When the service provider charges the
access to the queue, its optimum revenue is strictly decreas-
ing with the waiting cost.
We look now to the behavior of the optimum revenue when
the service provider decides to charge the information given
to incoming customers.
Proposition 3. When the service provider charges the
information, its optimum revenue is equal to zero when CW
tends to zero and goes to infinity when CW tends to infinity.
Based on the two previous propositions, as a corollary,
depending on the waiting cost (the level of sensibility of
customers to the waiting time into the queue) the provider
has to propose different pricing mechanism in order to max-
imize his revenue. Specifically, when this sensitivity is low,
the provider has an interest to charge the access whereas,
when the sensitivity is high, he will prefer to charge the in-
formation.
Note that there exist at most two thresholds as illustrated
on figure 4 that determine which pricing mechanism is the
best. Those thresholds cannot be given in a closed-form but
they can be easily determined numerically as illustrated in
the numerical section that follows.
5. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
In this section, we first show the performance of our heuris-
tic when provider charges the queue length information to
Figure 4: Thresholds Th1 and Th2 as a function of waiting
cost
new customer. Second, when provider charges the access
to the queue, we analyze the optimal price C∗Acc depend-
ing on the system settings. Finally, we study which pricing
mechanism gives the best revenue for the provider depending
on the waiting cost. We perform all our simulations using
Matlab server R2014b on a Dell Optiplex 9030 i5 running
Ubuntu MATE 16.04.
5.1 Heuristic’s performance
Heuristic approach is scored using different steps (we use
this step to update the new revenue value). Table 1 shows
the different steps and their total execution time. We pro-
vide also the gap between the result obtained using the
heuristic and the optimal value given by Matlab solver.
Step size 1 5.10−1 10−1
Total time (s) 0.095 0.146 54.640
Gap 2.10−4 10−4 10−8
Table 1: Performance summary of the heuristic
The results show clearly that the heuristic plays its role in
the optimization of the revenue provider. The algorithm
returns a very good approximate value but with high exe-
cution time when we use a small step. With the lower step
configured, the result obtained is close to 10−8 of the exact
value. On the other side, when we use higher steps, the gap
between the exact value and the value returned by our ap-
proach is important but we get the result with a reasonable
execution time.
5.2 Charging the access to the queue
Figure 5 and 6 show the provider’s revenue as a function
of the access fee. Here we use two system configurations in
order to get the optimal price C∗Acc. In figure 5, we obtain
that C∗Acc = (R − CWµ−λ ) = 18.33. This maximum revenue is
obtained when all customers join the queue, i.e. q∗ = 1.
Whereas, by considering a lower reward value, we obtain
C∗Acc = (R −
√
RCW
µ
) = 1.96. This result is illustrated on
figure 6 and, in this case, the maximum revenue is obtained
when part of customers join the queue, i.e. 0 < q∗ < 1.
5.3 Optimal pricing policy
Figure 7 gives a numerical example of the maximum rev-
enue obtained by the service provider depending on the pric-
Figure 5: Revenue as a function of Access fee when: µ = 2.8,
λ = 2.2, R = 20 and CW = 1
Figure 6: Revenue as a function of Access fee when: µ = 2.8,
λ = 2.2, R = 3 and CW = 1
ing mechanism used and as a function of waiting cost CW .
We observe that the maximum revenue based on the fee
of access is monotonically decreasing: this is because of
the increasing cost of the waiting time, which makes cus-
tomers reluctant to enter; they may be not willing to wait
for service avoiding paying too much. The result has been
proved theoretically in previous section. We observe more-
over that the maximum revenues based on inspection cost is
monotonically increasing which means that customers have
greater motivation to enter the system as the cost of wait-
ing increases. Then, this illustrate that there exists in fact
a unique threshold that determines which pricing policy is
the best. As a result, we obtain a threshold that allows the
provider to choose the best pricing policy.
Figure 7: Optimal revenues as a function of waiting cost
when: µ = 2.8, λ = 2.2 and R = 10
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have studied an unobservable queueing
game in which customers decide to get or not the informa-
tion about actual queue length in order to make their joining
decision. This strategic decision depends on numerous pa-
rameters of the system. In a first step, we have been able to
prove that this queueing game has a unique equilibrium and
we have been able to give his closed-form expression. In a
second step, we have analyzed the optimal pricing decision
for the provider in order to maximize his revenue, consid-
ering that the provider has to choose between charging the
information or the access to new customers. Interestingly,
we have obtained that charging the access of the service is
not always the best pricing policy, and this result depends
on the waiting cost. Particularly, when customers are very
impatient and strategic, it is preferable for the provider to
charge the information instead of the access to the service.
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APPENDIX
Proof of observation 1
Let us consider the expected utility for not getting the queue
length information as:
UNI =
∞∑
i=0
pii(R− CW i+ 1
µ
),
= UI + CI +
∞∑
i=ne
pii(R− CW i+ 1
µ
).
Note that ∀i ≥ ne we have R < CW i+1µ by definition of the
threshold ne given in equation (1). Then, when CI = 0 and
for any p ∈ [0, 1], we have:
UNI(p) < UI(p).
Proof of Theorem 1
At equilibrium p∗ , we have :
UNI(p
∗) = UI(p
∗),
which is equivalent to :
∞∑
i=ne
pii(p
∗)(R− CW i+ 1
µ
) = −CI ,
∞∑
i=ne
pii(p
∗)(CW
i+ 1
µ
−R) = CI ,
with:
pii(p) =
ρi(1− p)i−ne
1−ρne
1−ρ +
ρne
1−(1−p)ρ
.
We get to solve the following equation :
∞∑
i=ne
ρ
i
(1− p)i−ne (CW
i+ 1
µ
−R) = CI
(
1− ρne
1− ρ +
ρne
1− (1− p)ρ
)
.
From the left part, we get :
ρne
∞∑
i=0
(ρ(1− p))i(CW i+ ne + 1
µ
−R)
= ρne
∞∑
i=0
(ρ(1− p))iCW i
µ
+ (
CW (ne + 1)
µ
−R)ρne
∞∑
i=0
(ρ(1− p))i
=
ρneCW (1− p)ρ
µ(1− (1− p)ρ)2 +
ρneCW (ne + 1)−Rρneµ
µ(1− (1− p)ρ) .
And, from the right part, we get:
CI
(
1− ρne
1− ρ +
ρne
1− (1− p)ρ
)
=
CI(1− ρne )(1− (1− p)ρ) + CIρne (1− ρ)
(1− (1− p)ρ)(1− ρ) .
Then, we obtain:
ρneCW (1− p)ρ+ (ρneCW (ne + 1)−Rρneµ)(1− (1− p)ρ)
µ(1− (1− p)ρ)2
=
CI(1− ρne )(1− (1− p)ρ) + CIρne (1− ρ)
(1− (1− p)ρ)(1− ρ) .
Which is equivalent to:
(1− p)2 (µCI(1− ρne )ρ2)− (1− p)(CI(1− ρne )ρµ+K2ρµ
+ (1− ρ)(ρne+1CW − k1ρ)) +K2µ−K1(1− ρ) = 0.
To simplify the following computation, we define :
P = (1− p).
So, we get to solve the following second degree equation :
K3P
2 +K4P +K5 = 0.
If ∆ > 0, the solutions of the second degree equation will be:
P1 =
(
−K4−
√
∆
2K3
)
and P2 =
(
−K4+
√
∆
2K3
)
.
Which is equivalent to :
P1 =
1
2ρ
+
(1− ρne+1)
(1− ρne)2ρ +
(1− ρ)(ρne+1CW − cst1ρ)
2µCI(1− ρne)ρ2
−
√
∆
2µCI(1− ρne)ρ2 ,
P2 =
1
2ρ
+
(1− ρne+1)2ρ
(1− ρne) +
(1− ρ)(ρne+1CW − cst1ρ)
2µCI(1− ρne)ρ2
+
√
∆
2µCI(1− ρne)ρ2 .
We wish to determine the sign of p2. We have:
1
2ρ
> 1
2
because ρ <1 ⇒ 1
ρ
>1,
(1−ρne+1)
(1−ρne )
1
2ρ
> 1
2
because (1− ρne+1) > (1− ρne),
√
∆
2µCI (1−ρne )ρ2 > 0 because
√
∆ > 0 and (1− ρne) > 0,
(1−ρ)(ρne+1CW−K1ρ)
2µCI (1−ρne )ρ2 > 0 because
(1−ρ)(ρne+1CW−K1ρ)
2µCI (1−ρne )ρ2 =
(1−ρ)ρne+1(Rµ−CW b RµCW c)
2µCI (1−ρne )ρ2 > 0.
We can deduce that P2 > 1, and as p = 1 − P , we obtain
p2 <0. As a result, for each parameters set of the system, a
unique equilibrium p can exists defined by:
p∗ = p1 = 1− P1
or equivalently,
p∗ =
2ρ− 1
2ρ
− (1− ρ
ne+1)
2ρ(1− ρne ) −
(1− ρ)(ρne+1CW −K1ρ)−
√
∆
2µCI(1− ρne )ρ2
.
Proof of Proposition 1
We distinguish three cases to obtain the revenue:
RA(CAcc) =
λCAcc if CAcc ≤ R− CWµ−λ ,
CAcc(µ− CWR−CAcc ) if R−
CW
µ−λ ≤ CAcc ≤ R− CWµ ,
0 if CAcc > R− CWµ .
As a result, we obtain optimal access fee C∗Acc in each CAcc
interval, defined as follows:
When CAcc ≤ R− CWµ−λ , we have:
C∗Acc = R− CW
µ− λ .
When R− CW
µ−λ ≤ CAcc ≤ R− CWµ , we have:
RA(CAcc) = λq
∗(CAcc)CAcc,
= CAcc
(
µ− CW
R− CAcc
)
,
= CAccµ− CAccCW
R− CAcc .
This function is C∞ and taking its derivative equals to zero
gives:
R′A(CAcc) = 0⇔ µ− CW (R− CACC) + CACCCW
(R− CACC)2 = 0
⇔ µ− RCW
(R− CACC)2 = 0
⇔ (R− CAcc)2 = RCW
µ
⇔ C∗Acc = R−
√
RCW
µ
.
When CAcc > R− CWµ , we have: C∗Acc = 0.
Then, the optimal access fee C∗Acc is either:
R− CW
µ−λ or R−
√
RCW
µ
.
Proof of Proposition 2
When CAcc ≤ R − CWµ−λ , we have the following equation of
revenue as a function of waiting cost:
RA(CAcc(CW ), CW ) = λq
∗(C∗Acc(CW ))C
∗
Acc(CW ),
=
(
R− CW
µ− λ
)
λ,
= Rλ− λCW
µ− λ := Rˇ(CW ).
The derivate of this equation gives:
Rˇ′(CW ) =
−λ
µ− λ < 0.
When R − CW
µ−λ ≤ CAcc ≤ R − CWµ , we have the following
equation of revenue as a function of waiting cost:
RA(CAcc(CW ), CW ) = λq
∗(C∗Acc(CW ))C
∗
Acc(CW ),
=
µ− CW√
RCW
µ
(R−√RCW
µ
)
,
= CW −
√
CW (R
√
µ
R
− µ
√
R
µ
) + µR,
= CW − 2
√
µR
√
CW + µR := Rˇ(CW ).
The derivate of this equation gives:
Rˇ′(CW ) = 1−
√
µR√
CW
.
Rˇ′(CW ) < 0⇔ 1 <
√
µR√
CW
⇔ √CW <
√
µR
When,
CAcc > 0⇔ R >
√
RCW
µ
⇔
√
Rµ >
√
CW
Proof of Proposition 3
We have the following equation of revenue as function of the
waiting cost:
RI(CI(CW ), CW ) = λp
∗(C∗I (CW ))C
∗
I (CW ).
When CW tends to zero and for any CI , we have:
UI =
ne−1∑
i=0
pii(R− CW i+ 1
µ
)− CI −→
CW→0
R
ne−1∑
i=0
(pii)− CI ,
UNI =
∞∑
i=0
pii(R− CW i+ 1
µ
) −→
CW→0
R.
As a result, we obtain:
RI(CI(CW ), CW ) −→
CW→0
0.
Because,
UNI > UI =⇒ p∗ = 0.
When CW tends to infinity and for any CI , we have:
UNI = UI +
+∞1∑
i=ne
pii(R− CW i+ 1
µ
) + CI −→
CW→0
−∞,
UNI − UI < 0 =⇒ p∗ = 1.
As a result, we obtain:
RI(CI(CW ), CW ) −→
CW→+∞
+∞.
